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Subsidizing Agriculture in Belarus: 
Declared Objective and Actual Outcomes 
 
Summary 
This paper analyses the government’s objectives for development of the agricultural sector in 
Belarus, the performance within the sector over the last decade, and the current system of 
subsidizing agriculture. It is argued that the current system of subsidization does not attain the 
government’s declared objectives. The system is ineffective in the sense that not each rouble 
of agricultural subsidies reaches the agricultural enterprises: to a large extent the subsidies 
leak to the suppliers of purchased inputs, to the rural population and to the consumers of food 
products. Moreover, the government might be pursuing two incompatible objectives at the 
same time. The main conclusion of the paper is that the government should clearly restate its 
vision of the place of agriculture within the national economy, and work out a long-term 
development strategy for the sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The important question of what domestic support to agriculture should look like is on the 
current agendas of many countries. But where western governments often spend taxpayers’ 
money to limit the production of agricultural goods, the Belarusian government tries to keep 
agricultural production alive with the help of an enormous and complicated system of 
subsidies. Official sources admit that some 30 different subsidization schemes are currently in 
use. The declared objective of agricultural development and hence of subsidizing the sector is 
to achieve food sovereignty (autarchy) for the country. Does it make sense to pursue this 
objective? If so, does the current system of subsidies fit this objective optimally? An attempt 
to answer these questions is undertaken below. 
 
2. Description of the objectives, which the domestic support for agriculture is 
supposed to achieve according to the Belarusian government 
“The strategic objective of agribusiness development is achieving and maintaining food 
sovereignty of the country” – these are the first words of the “National programme for 
increasing the agribusiness efficiency for the period of 2000 to 2005”, the main document that 
sets the direction of development for the sector. “Food sovereignty” is defined to mean that 
domestic production should cover no less than 85% of the consumption of nine main product 
groups – grains, potatoes, vegetables, fruits, vegetable oil, sugar, milk, meat and eggs. 
The main declared aim of all oblast programs, is – in the words of the Minsk oblast for instance 
- “to ensure sustainable development and sustainable efficiency increases of the oblast’s agro-
industrial production, in order to increase the output of agricultural products”. 
Both, the increased output and greater efficiency are to be achieved through: “the technical 
and technological re-equipment of agriculture, strengthening of the productive potential, 
intensifying crops and livestock production, and social and economic transformation”. 
The concept of food sovereignty is poorly grounded both in theory and in practice. In fact, the 
Belarusian food production is to a large extent dependent on imported oil products, and on 
electric energy mainly imported from Russia or generated using imported energy resources. 
Thus, increasing food production in the name of food sovereignty would cause an increasing 
dependence on imported (moreover, from a single source: Russia) energy recourses, which 
contradicts the principle of overall economic sovereignty, which is also encouraged by the 
government. To define what is more efficient in macroeconomic terms – to import energy 
resources and use them to produce food, or to import food products directly - would require a 
separate study. 
 
3. Description of the system of subsidization versus performance of the sector 
3.1 Performance of the agricultural sector in recent years  
The agricultural sector is one of the most heavily regulated spheres of the Belarusian 
economy; mostly due to the important role agriculture plays in the economy. Unlike in the EU 
or even in some CIS countries, Belarusian agriculture employs 13.3% of the total labour force, 
it’s share in the GDP amounts to 8.9%1. The percentage of the rural population within the total 
population of Belarus remains at the level of 30%. The importance of agriculture has been 
declining over the last decade. In 1990 agriculture employed 19.1% of the total workforce and 
generated 22.9% of the GDP (see Figure 1). The trend itself is positive and illustrates that the 
process of correction of the structure of the national economy. The share of agriculture in the 
GDP of Belarus was (and to some extent still is) too high for an industrialized country. 
                                                          
1  Data for the year 2001. 
 3
Figure 1. The role of agriculture in the Belarusian economy 
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 Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis 
In Belarus, agricultural products are produced by three major entrepreneurial groups – state 
agricultural enterprises (SAEs), (which in their turn have various legal statuses and 
organizational structures, i.e. collective farms, state farms, etc.), households and private 
farmers. The agricultural output structure is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Structure of agricultural output in Belarus (%), 1990-2001 
Year 1990 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 
SAEs 76.3 51.6 51.1 60.6 54.5 61.2 60.6 
Households and private farmers 23.7 48.4 48.9 39.4 45.5 38.8 39.4 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis 
The main domestically produced basic foodstuffs are: cereals (18.9%), potatoes (17.1%), milk 
(14.0%), pork (11.5%), and vegetables (10.4%). 
Households and private farmers use much less land and other inputs than do collective farms 
to produce 65% of what the collective farms produce (in 2001). To do this, they only use 15% 
of the agricultural land, while the SAEs use the remaining 85%. 
Private farmers have not yet become an essential part of the Belarusian agricultural sector. 
The total number of private farmers peaked at 3000 in 1996, and is now around 2400. Private 
farmers occupy only 1% of the land and produce about 1% of the general output of all 
agricultural products. 
At first glance, the performance of individual producers of agricultural products is most 
impressive. Households produce about 40% of the general output of agricultural products, 
using only 15% of the total agricultural land area2. As much as 93% of wool, 89% of potatoes, 
85% of vegetables, 40% of eggs, 39% of milk, 26% of meat and poultry are produced by 
households. This paradox exists for two reasons: the incentives are better for households and 
an informal reallocation of productive resources from the collective farms to households takes 
place, which will be discussed below. 
While the output of the agricultural organisations has been stagnating, households have been 
producing more goods every year. The production volume of the SAEs has decreased to almost 
half the level of 1990, while households managed to increase their output of agricultural 
products by 26% (see Table 2).  
The agricultural sector generates significant losses in the Belarusian economy. The share of 
loss-making agricultural enterprises increased from 33.3% in 1998 to 58.7% in 2002. The total 
reported losses of SAEs amounted to 90 m USD in 2002, having increased from 25 m in 1998. 
Crop yields have declined since 1990. Grain yields decreased from 27.2 quintals per hectare in 
1990 to 19.9 in 2001, and the potato yield from 138 quintals per hectare to 123 over the same 
time period. 
                                                          
2  In fact, 40% may be a low estimate for the share of private production in overall agricultural output. 
Data on the volumes of goods produced by households are collected by the village councils and then 
forwarded to the rajon’s department of statistics. Quite often the local authorities shortcut the 
system and do not inspect all households properly. Generally Belarusians are inclined to 
underestimate the volumes of goods produced within their households, crop or milk yields etc. 
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Table 2. Dynamic of the output of agriculture (at constant prices), 1991-2001 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1990=100%           
Sector total 95.1 87.0 90.3 77.3 73.6 75.4 71.2 65.3 71.4 72.7 
SAE 92.0 76.5 73.4 61.8 54.6 55.2 56.1 48.6 54.1 55.5 
Households and 
private farmers  
104.6 119.4 142.0 124.9 132.3 137.8 117.7 116.6 125.1 126.2 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis 
3.2 Classification of the subsidies to the agricultural sector 
Financial support is provided to collective farms in a number of direct and indirect ways. The 
scale and scope of agricultural subsidization are extremely large and it’s difficult to estimate 
them accurately. One of the noteworthy things about the subsidies is that they not only 
support collective farms as organizations, but also allow the collective farms to support large 
“social spheres” and rural infrastructures as well as individuals who work or live in rural areas. 
All households producing agricultural products use the production resources of collective farms 
to some extent, and without full cost compensation. That means that at least some part of the 
state subsidies to collective farms end up subsidising the agricultural output of households. 
Every year the Belarusian government spends state funds equalling 3-4% of GDP (10-12% of 
the consolidated state expenditures) to support agricultural enterprises. This is only the visible 
portion of the subsidies. Many other support payments do not show up in the state budget. 
Generally speaking, all subsidies can be divided into the following groups: 
1. Budgeted state expenditures under the headings: “Expenditures for agriculture” and “ Fund 
for supporting producers of agricultural products” (central and local ones). 
2. Credits at below-market interest rates. These credits were made available by the National 
Bank until 2001; thereafter this burden was shifted to commercial banks. 
3. Write-offs of credits. 
4. Preferential tax treatment. 
5. Preferential (lower) prices for some purchased inputs (like fuel, electricity etc.). 
6. Non-monetary transfers from other sectors. Basically these are the most complicated and 
hidden forms of subsidies. 
This classification scheme is quite artificial, since the six groups overlap one another. For 
example, the amounts that are to cover the banks losses for their credits to the agricultural 
sector are partly included in the state budget. On the other hand, any losses that are not 
compensated for, i.e. when the banks are forced just to give away some of their money, this 
becomes an internal problem of the bank, which does not show up in the national statistics. 
It’s extremely difficult to estimate the expenditures under points 3, 4, 5 and 6. There are no 
statistics on these transactions. Many of these transactions arise out of regulations enacted by 
the oblast and rajon authorities. 
One of the most detailed descriptions of the channels of state support to agriculture can be 
found in the agribusiness development strategy 2001-2005 of the Minsk oblast. See Box 1 for 
the list of subsidies. 
Box 1. List of support measures, Program of agribusiness development in Minsk 
oblast for the period of 2001 to 2005 
1. Paying mark-ups to the legislated prices on agricultural products sold to the state 
reserve or within the oblast. 
2. Actions aimed at fertility increases of agricultural land. 
3. Financing a number of national and oblast programs, and technology-improving actions 
in various fields of agribusiness. 
4. Supporting pedigree breeding, compensating costs for artificial insemination. 
5. Subsidizing melioration work. 
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6. Actions preventing and eliminating especially dangerous cattle and plants diseases. 
7. Human resources development. 
8. Covering losses on prices of products that are socially important. 
9. Capital construction. 
10. Supporting implementation of regional development programs for the agro-industrial 
sector. 
11. Maintenance of public organisations that operate within the sector. 
12. Financing other strategically important actions. 
13. Buying agricultural machinery. 
14. Covering lease payments for rented machinery and equipment, covering interest rates 
for bank loans to purchase and repair machinery and equipment. 
15. Buying equipment for cattle farms. 
16. Buying machinery for other SAEs. 
17. Buying spare parts for the repair of agricultural machinery. 
18. Buying agricultural machinery for organizations that specialize in repairing agricultural 
machinery. 
19. Buying technological equipment to be used to repair agricultural machinery. 
20. Covering the 9% mark-ups for firms that buy, store and deliver agricultural machinery. 
21. Compensation for bank losses for loans for agricultural machinery repair. 
22. Covering commissions and insurance payments for loans intended to purchase 
agricultural machinery. 
23. Development of technology of agricultural production. 
24. Creation and development of high technology based production. 
 
The list in the Box 1 does not include such other widespread measures of support as tax 
preferences, debt rescheduling, credit write-offs, lower than normal industry tariffs for 
electricity and heat. Many of the measures enumerated fall within the Green Box measures of 
the WTO classification and are quite widespread in western countries too. Yet the largest 
portion of the measures would fall into the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) category, and 
can be classified as price support and as input subsidies. According to different governmental 
documents there are some 27-30 channels of agricultural subsidization in Belarus. 
During the WTO accession negotiations the Belarusian side requested a base total AMS of $752 
m (the average value over the base period of 1995 to 1997), wherein the product specific AMS 
amounts to $115.13 m, and the non-product specific AMS to $636.86 m. Tax exemptions 
valued at $282.76 m constitute the largest fraction of the $752 m.3 
The total amount of agricultural subsidies proposed during the WTO negotiations is about 2 to 
2.5 times higher than the amount of subsidies directly shown in the state budget. The purpose 
for doing this is to maintain the AMS at a certain level after having made the obligatory 
reductions upon WTO accession. 
3.3 Channels of subsidy distribution 
On their way from the government to the SAEs, agricultural subsidies affect several major 
players like banks, purchased input producers, food processors, the population of rural areas, 
and consumers of agricultural products. All these players are shown in Figure 2, which 
illustrates the channels of redistribution of agricultural subsidies in Belarus. The first step in 
this schematic is that banks (mainly Belagroprombank and Belarusbank) are forced to issue 
                                                          
3  Recommendations and proposals on the establishment of a common agrarian market among the CIS 
and the WTO issue:  at http://www.aris.ru/WIN_E/TACIS/TACIS_2001/a/ 
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loans to the SAEs, who use them to purchase various inputs – fertilisers, feed stuffs, seeds, 
fuel, electricity, machinery and equipment, etc. Some part of these loans is used for salaries of 
agricultural workers. Usually the inflows are too small to pay all debts, and because of soft 
budget constraints the government reschedules the overdue debts and forces the banks to 
issue additional loans. At a later time, some bank losses are compensated, but high inflation 
makes these compensations fairly meaningless. 
Figure 2. Channels of agricultural subsidies’ distribution in Belarus 
Source: author’s own 
As the SAEs are not only production entities but also perform some functions of the local 
administrations, they forward some of the inputs received to support the rural infrastructure, 
the so-called “social sphere” and, finally, to household agricultural production4. Nearly 
everyone who lives in rural areas, currently works or previously worked for an SAE, maintains 
a small private plot5, as well as many people working in the cities do. The private plots occupy 
only 15% of the agricultural land, but 40% of the agricultural output is produced thanks to 
their existence. This phenomenon exists because all current and past employees of the SAEs: 
i) use the machinery of their organizations on their private plots, paying only for the fuel, ii) 
obtain various feedstuff to feed their cattle and poultry for free, iii) receive some purchased 
inputs – fuel, fertilisers etc. for free, and iv) appropriate for their use some ready-to-be-sold 
products. These transfers are consumed within households, sold at the numerous market 
places directly to customers or sold to food processors and hence constitute part of the net 
income of the households. In actuality, the SAEs act as intermediaries between the households 
                                                          
4  As president Lukashenka put it in a recent interview: “Why do I support collective farms? It is very 
simple. 35% of the pensioners live there. They used to work there. A collective farm is not only a 
firm, but also an administrative body. Neither the local council, nor the village administration take 
decisions, or help people, it is the collective farms that do this. What would it mean to destroy this 
system today? It would mean to ruin 35% of those people who can hardly make a living today. We 
should keep this in mind. You see, they {collective farms} fulfil major social duties in rural areas. 
And we make collective farms fulfil these duties. But we help them as well”. 
5  One may possess a private property plot with a size up to 3 ha for this purpose. 
SAE 
State 
Banking Sector 
Food processing 
Input producers 
Households/ 
Social sphere 
Consumers 
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and the food processing firms, collecting milk and cattle from the former and delivering it to 
the latter. In the relationship between the SAEs and households, agricultural subsidies leak 
from the former to the latter, then parts of them get back to the SAEs in the form of 
purchased products and the remainder stays with the households. 
After the agricultural products are produced, they are sold at legislated prices to food 
processors. As a rule, the legislated prices are lower than cost of producing the product, 
therefore subsidies are passed on to the food processing firms and hence to consumers. 
The connection between the SAEs and the input suppliers, especially domestic ones, is not as 
clear as between the SAEs and other players. On the one hand, the various input suppliers 
experience a more or less stable demand for their products, but on the other, payments for 
delivered products are almost always delayed and are often made through various barter and 
other clearing schemes.6 
3.4 Effectiveness of the current system of agricultural subsidies 
As a matter of fact, subsidies are provided to state agricultural enterprises without ever being 
related to their performances. Thus, it can hardly be said that the subsidies are aimed at 
supporting agriculture or at ensuring the “food sovereignty” of the country through increased 
production, rather than at simply supporting people who work in the agricultural sector or live 
in rural areas. To be more specific, it should be noted that these social groups constitute more 
than one third of country’s electorate. 
There is an almost perfect correlation between the state expenditure per employee and the 
average annual salary in the sector (see Table 3). This fact also proves that the subsidies are 
simply aimed at supporting workers on collective farms. Moreover, the amount of the subsidies 
allocated by the state budget divided by the number of employees of the SAEs exceeds the 
average annual salary of these employees. Thus, the amount of domestic support to 
agriculture is large enough to cover the salaries of agricultural workers, providing them the 
opportunity not to work for their SAEs. 
As the 1999-2001 data shows, the SAEs receive only 70 percent of their inflows as payments 
for delivered products and services, and 20% as direct subsidies and credits. If non-monetary 
transfers were counted as well, this share would be much larger yet. 
Table 3. Selected indicators of the agricultural 
sector in Belarus, 1998-2003 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
2003, 1st 
quarter 
Total budget expenses for agriculture, m 
USD7 
170.6 148.7 372.2 452.8 418.1 107.5 
Share in GDP, % 3.0 2.6 4.3 3.8 2.9 2.3 
Gross losses, m USD 25.8 15.6 43.1 85.3 90.6 26.9 
Share of loss-making enterprises 33.3 36.9 39.4 54.2 58.7 n. a. 
Number of enterprises 2489 2459 2414 2388 2388 2388 
Expenditures per enterprise, thousand USD 68.6 60.5 154.2 189.6 175.1 45.0 
Number of employees in agriculture, 
thousands 
624 588 560 527 550 500 
Expenditures per employee, USD 273.5 252.8 664.6 859.2 760.2 214.8 
Average annual (quarterly) salary, USD 261.2 249.5 433.1 680.9 748.5 216.7 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis, own calculations based on the MSA data  
On the other hand, the state agencies still buy a great portion of the raw agricultural products 
at legislated prices, which are below market prices. Each collective farm has an obligation to 
supply a pre-determined volume of products every year. That’s why such a large share of 
agricultural enterprises makes losses. The existence of the various obligatory provisions and 
                                                          
6  For instance, there is an item in the state budget called “Covering the indebtedness of the Minsk 
tractor plant to the Social Protection Fund by delivering produced tractors to the SAEs”. This 
particular figure alone amounts to about USD 2.5 m in 2003. 
7  The conversion rate used is the market exchange rate. The official and market exchange rates used 
to differ greatly until the end of 2001. 
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subsidization makes the entire system obscure. At the end of the day, it’s impossible to define 
whether the agricultural sector benefits from these policies or not. 
 
4. Actual objectives which the domestic support for agriculture ought to achieve 
Since the SAEs failed to increase their outputs (and efficiencies) significantly over the recent 
years, and it seems absolutely impossible to achieve the food sovereignty goal set by the 
government, it can be argued that either these objectives are unrealistic or the policy itself is 
inappropriate. Looking at the recent performance of the sector – the low production efficiency, 
the high indebtedness, the high number of loss-making enterprises, etc – it seems quite logical 
to suppose that the subsidies are actually counterproductive. The amount of subsidies 
increases, but so do the losses generated in the agribusiness. 
These facts suggest that the actual objectives of the state support for agriculture may be 
different from the officially stated goals. Since the rural areas in Belarus are far less developed 
than the cities, subsidising agriculture is too attractive a way of raising the welfare of the rural 
population to be ignored by the Belarusian government. The problem is that the SAE 
subsidization methods used by the government today are not the best solution for the 
problem. Many studies on transfer efficiency8 in OECD countries (which includes transition 
economies such as Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic) have shown that support 
measures like price support and input subsidization are among the least efficient approaches 
for raising farm incomes. Huge amounts of subsidies of this kind leak to input suppliers and 
customers without significantly raising farm revenues (see the Appendix for precise numbers 
for OECD countries. Though this doesn’t imply that the numbers would be exactly the same for 
Belarus, the tendency is undoubtedly similar). 
As we have already seen, subsidies to the SAEs leak to the population of rural areas and 
increase their welfare. Yet this is quite an unusual and expensive way to increase the welfare 
of the rural population, since it involves the constant use of thievery and corrupt practices. 
Besides, even this informal support doesn’t help to increase standard of living in rural areas to 
an acceptable level. Salaries and the general standard of living in rural areas are lower then in 
cities, which is why there is a permanent migration and brain drain from rural areas to the 
cities. One more proof is that the average salary of a worker at a plant producing agricultural 
machinery is much higher than that of a collective farm worker. 
It’s easy to notice the contradiction between the declared and actual objectives of the 
subsidization. Making agriculture more productive and implementing modern technologies as 
stated in the official programs means replacing labour with capital at the farms. If other 
branches of the economy cannot absorb the redundant agricultural labour force, this will 
inevitably create huge unemployment and a further decrease in the welfare of the rural 
population.9 
 
5. Conclusions 
1. The declared objective of agribusiness development and subsidization – achieving food 
sovereignty for the country through increased productivity and efficiency of the 
agribusiness – contradicts the other often stated objective of subsidising agriculture, 
which is maintaining and increasing the standard of living in rural areas. Pursuing two 
incompatible objectives at the same time will not produce an efficient outcome. The 
existence of this paradox within the national agricultural policy suggests that a long-
term reassessment of agriculture’s role in the economy is needed. 
                                                          
8  The term “transfer efficiency” of agricultural support generally refers to the effectiveness of 
agricultural policies in delivering additional income to farm households. It illustrates how much of the 
benefit from every rouble of taxpayers’ money spent on agriculture reaches the farmers and how 
much is received by other players or is simply wasted. 
9  In East Germany, about 85% of the labour that had been employed at agricultural enterprises was 
eliminated within just a few years following reunification. Farms became much more productive very 
quickly, but in many rural areas unemployment is still as high as 25-30%. 
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2. If the government wants to increase food production through making the national 
agribusiness more efficient and compatible, it should reform the enterprises and provide 
producers of agricultural products with stronger incentives. To do so, the partial 
elimination of the currently unfocused agricultural subsidies rather then their extension 
would be required. 
3. If the government actually wants to maintain a certain standard of living in rural areas, 
the tools that are currently employed are the least efficient ones. Support measures 
such as price supports and input subsidies do not increase the SAEs’ revenues 
significantly and are even less helpful for increasing the welfare of the rural population. 
Direct income transfers would be of much greater help for the rural population than 
price support and input subsidization measures for SAEs. 
 
Dz. B., S. C., Lector – A. Ch. 
August 2003 
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Figure 1. The income transfer efficiency of market price support 
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Source: Agricultural policies in the OECD countries: A positive reform agenda. COM/AGR/TD/WP(2002)19/FINAL 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The income transfer efficiency of input subsidies 
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Source: Agricultural policies in the OECD countries: A positive reform agenda. COM/AGR/TD/WP(2002)19/FINAL 
 
 
